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Introduction 
 
 In a presentation to the World Bank’s Executive Board in July 2009, at the height of 
the present global financial crisis, I argued that we have to prepare ourselves for the next 
crisis and its impact on the poor, even though we do not know when the next crisis will 
strike and what its precise impacts will be.
1
 I proposed three stages of systematic 
preparation at the country level. First, a program of assessment, which “stress tests” the 
social protection system against a range of crises, to identify gaps and weaknesses, 
analogously to the role that the Financial Sector Assessment Program plays in stress testing 
the financial system. Second, a medium term program of financing improvements in social 
protection programs, now viewed as a system, to close gaps and address weaknesses. Third, 
a pre-qualified line of assistance for social protection that would be available to a country 
immediately that agreed crisis triggers are breached. 
 
 These three steps are somewhat different in nature and require different types for a 
discussion and debate. The third step has to be formulated in the context of overall 
development financing, and indeed a permanent “Crisis Response Window” is being 
discussed in the context of the current IDA16 replenishment. The second step comes close 
to “normal business” for donor agencies, although there are issues about the extent to 
which funding of precautionary investments, for a crisis sometime in the future,  will be 
attractive (to donors and recipients) relative to expenditures with immediate impact. 
However, both of these steps build upon, and depend upon, a solid assessment of how the 
collection of social protection programs as currently constituted would or would not 
respond to protect the poor in the face of a range of crises. The set of papers presented at 
the World Bank workshop on simulating the impacts of crisis is an excellent contribution to 
this effort. In this note I will briefly discuss why the effort is important, and then consider 
some of the specifics of the analysis. 
                                                 
*
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Professor of Economics. This is a commentary on papers and presentations at the World Bank workshop on 
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The Need for a Social Protection Assessment Program (SPAP) 
 
 The present global financial crisis will pass. But crises are here to stay. By a crisis I 
mean a macro-level shock over which the country itself has no control, but which affects 
economic wellbeing in the country. A crisis worth the label will have a dramatic negative 
impact on per capita income. But the precise impact on the pattern of incomes and 
wellbeing will depend on the precise origin and nature of the crisis. Developing countries 
are likely to face many such sources—natural climatic disasters; sudden emergence and 
spread of an infectious disease; unrest in a neighboring country with possible flow of 
refugees; collapse of demand in a particular industry (such as tourism as a result of real or 
perceived terrorism threats, or sudden shifts in fashion in apparel); or the consequences of a 
global financial crisis. Each of these headings in turn covers many specific possibilities (for 
example, the financial crisis of 1997 is recognized to have been quite different in nature 
and impact from the crisis that began in 2007-8). Further, for a given country, particularly a 
small country, a global crisis can have very different impact depending on the 
(unpredictable) reactions of its large neighbors or trading partners). 
 
Each of the different types of crises will have very different types of impact on the 
poor in different countries, depending again on the detail of economic structure in that 
country. Added to the uncertainty of crisis type is uncertainty of crisis timing—timing of 
the onset of the crisis, and timing of when it recedes (the latter depending on uncertain 
policy responses). 
 
I have argued that these twin uncertainties—of crisis type and crisis timing—should 
frame the development of an ex ante strategy for protecting the poor. We should examine 
how the current social protection programs, viewed as a system, would respond to the 
needs created by crises of different types. We should “stress test” the system to identify 
vulnerabilities and gaps in (i) coverage and (ii) flexibility and speed of response. Such a 
comprehensive assessment would be a Social Protection Assessment Program (SPAP), 
corresponding to the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). I would now like to 
review the workshop presentations with this objective in mind. 
 
An Overview of the Workshop Papers and Presentations 
 
 The papers and presentations at the World Bank Workshop on Distributional 
Impacts of the Crisis represent an important contribution to our understanding of crises, 
their impacts on the poor, and how social protection programs can and have responded.
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 My commentary is based on the following papers or PowerPoint presentations (i) “Analyzing the poverty 
and distributional impacts of macro shocks in developing countries: A microsimulation approach,” 
(PowerPoint), Poverty Reduction Group, PREM, World Bank; (ii) “The impact of the financial crisis on 
poverty and income distribution: insights from simulations in selected countries,” by Bilal Habib, Ambar 
Narayan, Segio Oliveri and Carolina Sanchez, Economic Premise, March 2010. No. 7; (iii) “Assessing the 
employment and welfare impacts of the 2009 recession in Latvia and Turkey,” (PowerPoint), Ihsan Ajwad, 
Meltem Aran, Mehtabul Azam, Jesko Hentschel; (iv) “Impact of shocks and role of social protection: the case 
of Brazil,” (Powerpoint), Francisco Ferreira, Anna Fruttero, Philippe Leite and Leonardo Lucchetti; (v) 
“Assessing poverty and distributional impacts of the global crisis in the Philippines: A microsimulation 
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The presentation “Analyzing the poverty and distributional impacts of macro shocks in 
developing countries: A microsimulation approach,” by the Poverty Reduction Group, sets 
out the overall approach. 
 
 The first step is to model the crisis itself and its macro impacts on the economy.  
This requires a careful enumeration, elaboration and discussion of the transmission 
mechanisms. The exercise has to be country specific, and will involve a fair amount of 
judgment, for example on assumptions made about near neighbors’ policy responses, which 
in turn can influence macro outcomes for the country. From these would come various 
macroeconomic projections—overall and sectoral growth, inflation in general and in its 
major components such as food and fuel, exchange rate, international remittances, etc. 
Building on these would come projections of employment and unemployment. A key 
method for translating these macro projections to the household level are estimated models 
of labor force status and Mincerian wage equations, and assumptions that allocate 
international and domestic remittances across households. 
 
 With the above procedure, and a base household survey, one can project the 
distributional impact of the crisis being modeled. Poverty calculations can then be done 
assuming that the expenditure to income ratio stays constant. Impacts across the 
distribution can be shown using growth incidence curves and other methods. Who is likely 
to become poor, in terms of household characteristics can thus be identified. 
 
 The general approach is then applied to a number of countries (Philippines, 
Bangladesh and Poland are the focus in the presentation) for scenarios matching the impact 
of the global financial crisis. The results are intuitive, but interesting and of relevance for 
policy. Poverty rises but there is not much of an impact on overall inequality. The new poor 
tend to be different from those who were poor before the crisis—in other words, the crisis 
impacts specific sections of the population. And the impacts are particularly concentrated 
in the middle of the income distribution. 
 
An Assessment, and What’s Missing 
 
The above is a broad summary of the papers and presentations. Of course there is 
much greater detail in the specific papers, and there is a rich weaving together of country 
specific institutional factors. But the overall approach and method should be clear. While 
one can of course have specific comments and criticisms of the individual country studies, 
or one or more of the components described above, my overall assessment is that this is an 
excellent start in the direction of what I have in mind, namely preparing ourselves for 
protecting the poor against the next crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                    
approach,” Bilal Habib, Ambar Narayan, Sergio Oliveri and Carolina Sanchez-Paramo; (vi) “Assessing ex 
ante the poverty and distributional impact of the global crisis in a developing country: A microsimulation 
approach with application to Bangladesh,” Bilal Habib, Ambar Narayan, Segio Oliveri and Carolina Sanchez-
Paramo; (vii) “A methodology note on the employment and welfare impacts of the 2007-08 financial crisis,” 
Meltem Aran, Mehtabul Azam, Mhamed Ihsan Ajwad and Jesko Hentschel; (viii) “Employment, poverty and 
distributional impacts of the crisis in Poland: Brief overview of results from microsimulation exercises.” 
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The authors of the studies and overall summary are of course themselves aware of 
the limitations—the level of disaggregation depends on availability of macro projections; 
various structural relationships are assumed to remain unchanged; no factor mobility; share 
of profits remains constant; etc. But moving in this direction would require a full-fledged 
general equilibrium model of the economy, the construction and operation of which would 
require its own assumptions and make its own data demands. 
 
In my view, for the task at hand this project has struck the right balance between 
fine detailed modeling of economic relationships and interactions, and the need to get to 
concrete results with the data available. I would like to suggest, however, that effort should 
go further developing a number of missing elements which are central to providing a 
complete picture of impacts on the poor. 
 
There is a strong focus on labor market status and labor income. Other sources of 
income are not treated with the same degree of careful attention. This may be acceptable in 
economies where labor income is the dominant source of income for the poor, such as in 
transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe, but for economies where small holder 
agriculture is significant specific effort will have to go into modeling the farm and non-
farm production activities of the household. I would see this as an issue in the Bangladesh 
case, for example. Now, it may well be that the financial crisis, which was the focus of this 
project, transmits its impacts mainly through labor markets in the manufacturing sector. 
But for crises in general there should be a capacity to build in transmission mechanisms 
that affect farm incomes and incomes from non-farm artisanal activities. For example, the 
impact of climate driven crises will certainly have this as a major transmission mechanism. 
 
I would like to use the above to make two further, more general, points. There is a 
strategic choice between how general our model should be—whether the base model 
should be able to capture a range of different types of crises, or whether the modeling itself 
should be done crisis by crisis. While a final answer to this will have to wait for the results 
of trial and error, my initial position is that for a capacity to do ex ante assessments of 
crises as a category, we perhaps need a broader range of transmission mechanisms built in 
to the modeling, even if we decide to switch some of them off for specific simulations. In 
any event, what should be resisted is the notion that the same set of transmission 
mechanisms can be translated across crises. 
 
My second point relates to the role of income in this analysis. The sources of 
household income are crucial in following through the macro transmission mechanisms 
down to the level of poor households. And yet, it might be argued with some justification 
that we give more importance in our household surveys to the expenditure side of 
information gathering. This flows from our natural concern with measuring poverty, and 
from the broad consensus that expenditure data are the best for this task. But the impacts of 
crises, and indeed of any major macro change whether short term or long term, on poverty 
passes through income. We need to be able to allocate macro level shifts in income 
composition, by sector and by factor, down to the household level. For this we need a 
detailed account of the sources of household income in our household surveys. I would 
argue that this aspect is underemphasized in household income and expenditure surveys, 
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particularly for agrarian economies. With given survey resources, the balance between 
emphasis on the expenditure modules and the income, employment and activity modules is 
a difficult one to assess. But the line of work in these papers, and the line of work that 
would be needed to get a handle on the impact of crises on the poor, argues for more 
weight than is currently given to modules that help to pin down the sources of income. 
 
A central aspect of my proposed “stress testing” of the social protection system, in 
the face of different types of crises, is the need to model how individual protection 
programs will respond to different impacts of the crisis, transmitted through different 
mechanisms that are country and crisis specific. This is done to some extent in the Poland 
study for unemployment insurance, and it is the focus of the Brazil study for two selected 
programs, but I would like to argue that this aspect is not as well developed in these papers 
and presentations as it should be. 
  
What is it that needs to be done? For each country, we first of all need an inventory 
of the major social protection programs and, very important, their rules of operation. The 
most obvious programs for the “employment/unemployment” focus of the present set of 
papers and presentations are of course unemployment benefit programs, and this is what is 
done for example in the Poland study. Thus when the crisis is simulated, and its 
unemployment effects are projected, the income impacts follow from the wage equations, 
but the net income impacts, that is to say net of unemployment benefits, need to be 
simulated based on the rules of unemployment benefit in that particular country.  
 
But unemployment benefits are only one of a myriad of programs whose rules will, 
in principle, affect flows of public resources to households when a crisis hits. Thus, for 
example, programs of conditional cash transfers have specific rules of eligibility, 
sometimes based on assessed household income. If the crisis leads to a dramatic fall in the 
incomes of some categories of households, and the eligibility assessment happens soon 
after the crisis hits, then these households will start receiving cash transfers. Although the 
logic of the program may have little to do with crisis support—it may instead be to do with 
incentivizing behaviors such as keeping children in school ,or early health checks—in its 
operation it in effect becomes crisis support, and needs to be incorporated into the analysis. 
If these programs were small then perhaps they could be ignored. But some of these 
programs are very large in some countries—Progresa-Oportunidades in Mexico or the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India, for example. And even if individual 
programs are small, if as a collectivity they represent significant injection to poor 
households, then they need to be incorporated systematically into the analysis of the 
possible impacts of crises on the poor. 
 
The above perspective requires of household surveys that they capture flows to 
households from social programs, distinguished by program in some detail. This is yet 
another dimension of the importance of having a detailed accounting of the sources of 
household income—market and non-market. The extent of detail available is likely to vary 
from country to country. The best is if the actual cash flow from different programs is 
accounted for. If this is not available, but there is information on whether the household 
participates or not, this could be used to develop assumptions on how the total outlay of the 
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program (which we would get from national level administrative data) could be allocated 
across households as a baseline—in the same way that international remittances were 
allocated in the current project. In any event, what is important is that we do develop such a 
baseline where the monetary benefits of major social protection programs are allocated 
across households. 
 
There are two further issues on social programs that I want to raise on this theme of 
social protection programs in crises. First, there are programs that make a contribution in 
kind, not cash. Free food, or subsidized food from ration shops, is the leading example, but 
there are others such as the excusing of school fees or paying for school uniforms etc. 
There is of course a monetary equivalent of these in kind transfers, and if these transfers to 
households change as program rules dictate when the crisis hits, then they should in 
principle be incorporated into the analysis. 
 
The second issue is an important one, but difficult to address in practice. Of course, 
from the program rules of eligibility we can identify households that would fall into the 
program after the crisis hits, or specify the change in benefits of households already 
enrolled in the program. But this is the de jure analysis. In reality, whether the program 
delivers on the benefits depends on the budgetary allocations made to it. A good example 
of this is an “employment guarantee” scheme. In these programs, employment is 
supposedly guaranteed at a given wage (usually the local minimum wage) to all who turn 
up to the public works site. Thus, when the transmission mechanisms translate the crisis 
into employment losses and sharp wage declines, the number of people showing up at the 
public works site goes up. But will they be hired? The answer depends of course on 
whether the budget will rise pari passu. If it does not, there will be rationing of 
employment. For the domestic political economy, this raises the question of whether such 
budgetary allocations can indeed be guaranteed. In India, the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act provides a justiciable guarantee, an example of the polity trying to tie its 
own hands behind its back. For analyst, however, the above scenario requires that a 
judgment has to be made on whether or not budgets will indeed be increased to convert de 
jure rules into de facto outcomes. Of course, once the machinery for simulations is set up, 
we can simulate the impact of different levels of budgetary provisions, if we are willing to 
model how the rationing is implemented.  
  
All of the above is in relation to identifying needs, gaps and vulnerabilities as a 
range of crises materializes. But recall that there are two types of uncertainties—
uncertainty of crisis type and uncertainty of crisis timing. The second type of uncertainty 
also raises issues for policy. In particular, it requires us to focus not so much on the ex ante 
comprehensiveness of the system of social protection programs, but on their flexibility. And 
this flexibility has two aspects—rapid response in scaling up programs when the crisis 
strikes, and equally rapid scaling sown when the crisis passes. In a sense we have already 
touched on the first—the question of budgetary resource availability can be related to the 
speed with which budgets can be increased. But we have not as yet discussed flexibility in 
the other direction, and this requires us to discuss what happens when the crisis passes—
which none of the papers or presentations in the workshop do. 
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 To illustrate the issues that arise, let us compare food and fuel subsidies with 
employment guarantee schemes. On the scaling up side, the first has relatively easy 
flexibility both in technical terms (for example, simply reintroducing pass-through 
provisions for global fuel prices into domestic fuel prices) and in terms of political 
economy (generalized subsidies will have greater political support than employment 
schemes, which benefit only the poorest). When the crisis passes, however, the ranking is 
reversed. As employment and wages pick up after the crisis, public works rolls will 
presumably simply melt away as workers move to better opportunities in the rest of the 
economy. But once generalized subsidies are increased, it is very difficult politically to 
reduce them—for the very reason that the constituency that benefits from them is much 
larger. 
  
The general point I am making is that an assessment of how well a social protection 
system does in the face of a crisis is incomplete without an assessment of what is left 
behind when the crisis passes. A full assessment will allow us to better design ex ante 
programs that, as a collectivity, are comprehensive and flexible, and flexible moreover in 
both directions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 To conclude, I have looked at the papers and presentations in the workshop through 
a particular lens—whether they contribute towards preparing to protect the poor against the 
next crisis.  I believe they represent an excellent step in this direction, and any further work 
should and indeed will have to use them as a starting point. But future work will also need 
to extend and elaborate the analysis conducted here in a number of directions, including 
different types of crises, sources of market income, sources of non-market income, and the 
operation of a full range of social protection programs when crises hit and when crises 
recede. 
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